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Abstract This paper will argue that the work of Slavoj Žižek can be fruitfully
understood as a response to mystical theology as it has been received in two strands
of 20th century French thought—psychoanalysis and phenomenology—and that
Žižek's work in turn offers intriguing possibilities for the re-figuring of mystical
theology by feminist philosophy of religion. Twentieth century French psychoanalysis
is dominated by the work of Jacques Lacan and by his students Julia Kristeva and Luce
Irigaray. All three of these figures engage in significant ways with mystical theology—
particularly with the works and figures of female mystics—as a crucial resource for
theorising gender and subjectivity. A second strand of the 20th century French recep-
tion of mystical theology is the phenomenological tradition, specifically the work of
Jacques Derrida. This paper will argue that, drawing on and challenging both of these
elements of recent French engagement with mystical theology, Žižek's work offers a
materialist ontology which seeks to locate transcendence within immanence and
materiality, offering to feminist philosophy of religion the resources for re-thinking
the relationship of the mystical to the material.
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Very little has been written about Žižek and his relationship to mystical theology, and
of course, there is always the danger that there is a good reason for this omission. But
the wager of this paper is threefold: first, that the contours of Žižek’s thought are very
deeply shaped by the 20th century French reception of mysticism; second, that
reading Žižek in this light illuminates crucial contours of his work; and third, that
as a result of these first two claims, Žižek’s work in turn offers intriguing possibilities
for a feminist philosophy of religion which seeks to engage with the question of
mysticism.
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Christian mystical theology came into being through the conjunction of still-emergent
doctrinal orthodoxywith Neoplatonism.1 The synthesis which emerged, figuring creation
and redemption as a process of emanation and return, has been both enormously fruitful
and hugely problematic for the Christian culture to which it gave birth. Amongst other
issues, this model has tended to see progress towards God as progress away from the body
and has therefore lent itself to deeply patriarchal forms of religious thought.2 Feminist
philosophy of religion has had to grapple with this legacy. Žižek’s work does not
obviously or straightforwardly belong with that of feminist philosophers of religion.
Yet the defining feature of his philosophical system is his attempt to draw together
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian dialectics and contemporary quantum physics into a
materialist ontology which repeats differently the Neoplatonic attempt to depict the
structures of language, desire and the material world as fundamentally connected to
one another. As such, Žižek’s work offers to feminist philosophy of religion the possi-
bility of rethinking the relationship between the mystical and the material. Here, I will
trace Žižek’s engagement with recent continental philosophical discussions of the rela-
tionship of mystical theology, language and desire in order to demonstrate this claim.
Mystical theology is so common as to sometimes appear inescapable in recent
continental philosophy.3 As a result, it is in some ways inevitable that Žižek, located
firmly within this tradition, should be shaped to some extent by the French engagement
with mysticism.4 However, there are two main ways in which the French reception of
mysticism shapes Žižek’s work: firstly, through the theological turn associated with
phenomenology and with Derrida in particular, and secondly, through the French
psychoanalytic tradition, particularly Jacques Lacan, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva.
I will suggest, roughly, that Derrida represents for Žižek the problem he is attempting to
solve and Lacan the figure to whom he turns to solve this problem, engaging as he does
1 See, for example, Denys Turner’s discussion of the development of the Christian mystical tradition in The
Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1–5; or
Grace Jantzen’s summary of the same process in Grace, Death and the Displacement of Beauty. Volume One:
Foundations of Violence (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 357.
2 For a more detailed discussion of how these issues play out in subsequent Christian theology, see my article
‘The body and ethics in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae’ in New Blackfriars 94.1053 (2013), 540–551.
3 The relationship of negative or mystical theology to continental philosophy has proved a fertile theme for
recent works in theology and philosophy of religion. Examples include Amy Hollywood’s ‘Beauvoir, Irigaray
and the Mystical’ in Hypatia 9.4 (1994), 158–185 and ‘Mysticism, Death and Desire in the Work of Hélène
Cixous and Catherine Clément’ in Religion in French Feminist Thought: Critical Perspectives, eds. Morny
Joy, Kathleen O’Grady and Judith L. Poxon (London: Routledge, 2003), 145–161, and Sensible Ecstasy:
Mysticism, Sexual Difference and the Demands of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002); Arthur
Bradley’s Negative Theology and Modern French Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2004); Sanford Budick
and Wolfgang Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary
Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Jeffrey L. Kosky, ‘Contemporary Encounters with
Apophatic Theology: The Case of Emmanuel Levinas’ in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 1.3
(2000), http://www.jcrt.org/archives/01.3/kosky.shtml; Harold Coward and Toby Foshay’s edited volume,
Derrida and Negative Theology (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992); and William
Franke (ed.) On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature and the
Arts. Volume 1: Classic Formulations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).
4 This article originated as a paper delivered at the 2013 conference ‘Mystical Theology: Eruptions from
France’ and so focuses on Žižek’s work in relation to French thought specifically (with a brief foray into the
work of the Belgian philosopher Julia Kristeva. There is also much to be said about Žižek’s relationship to
mysticism in Western thought more generally and particularly to the trajectory of mystical theology in
Germany, a line of descent by which mystical ideas made their way via Meister Eckhart and Jakob Böhme
into the work of Hegel and Heidegger.
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so with questions of gender, sexuality and embodiment which are central to feminist
philosophy of religion.
Ontotheology and Desire in Derrida and Žižek
Derrida's first discussion of mystical theology came during his 1968 lecture, ‘Différance’.5
For Derrida, différance names the impossibility of closure, mastery or totality; it is the gap
between the sign and the thing signified. In this earlier essay, Derrida says that, although
the denials and refusals of différance may sound like negative theology, they are not.
Negative theology names a superabundance, a hyperessence, a transcendent anchor for
language; while différance ‘is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological—
ontotheological—reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which
ontotheology—philosophy—produces its system and its history; it includes ontotheology,
inscribing it and exceeding it without return.’6 Yet Derrida repeatedly returns to this
question of negative theology and comes in time to acknowledge that it is not, after all, so
easy to distinguish from his own project. Negative theology and deconstruction have in
common, the later Derrida acknowledges, a relationship to the question of how to avoid
speaking about that which cannot be spoken about; both are concerned with the estab-
lishment and the undoing of boundaries, of identity, of desire.7
For Derrida, negative theology is riven by the contradictory desire to establish
borders and to transgress them; it is both absolutely faithful to theological dogma and
also that which absolutely unsettles and undoes all theological propositions; it is torn
between negation as the hyper-affirmation of a good beyond being and negation as the
acknowledgement of an impossibility, an absence, at the heart of all identity.8 As such,
negative theology is the condition of both the possibility and the impossibility of
theological speech, and it therefore shares the structure of other key notions within
Derrida's thought: death, pharmakon, the gift, différance,9 and also of Derrida's key
ethical notions which require both identity and its disruption, such as hospitality, which
requires the host to freely give that which yet remains her own.10
5 Published in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982), 1–28. David Newheiser points out, however, that Derrida was engaging with the negative
theology of Dionysius the Areopagite as early as 1952 (Unforeseeable God (unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Chicago, 2012), 59).
6 ‘Différance’, 6.
7 For example, in ‘Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices’ (translated by John P. Leavey Jr. in Derrida and
Negative Theology, eds. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, (New York: State University of New York Press,
1992)), Derrida acknowledges the multiplicity of apophatic theology (283), its transgression of boundaries
(284), its disruption of identity (311), and its relationship to both death and desire (285, 291).
8 In ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ (translated by Ken Frieden inDerrida and Negative Theology, eds. Harold
Coward and Toby Foshay (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992)), Derrida divides negative
theology into that which proceeds according to the logic of the agathon, the Platonic idea of theGood as the source
and goal of being, and the khora, the ungraspable opening which is neither being nor non-being (101, 104).
9 Hugh Rayment-Pickard points out that many of Derrida’s key notions share the structure of the chiasmus,
‘the “other” of the circle” which resists and disrupts economy and closure, yet which offered not instead of the
circle but as internal to it (Impossible God: Derrida’s Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 159.
10 Derrida describes the paradoxical nature of hospitality, the way in which ‘one can become virtually
xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one’s own hospitality, the own home that makes possible
one’s own hospitality’ (‘Foreigner Question’ in Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida
to respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 53).
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Although Žižek is often dismissive of ‘the usual gang of democracy-to-come-
deconstructionist-postsecular-Levinasian-respect-for-Otherness suspects’, he repeatedly
acknowledges the proximity of Derrida's thought to his own.11 Though he critiques
Derrida on numerous occasions, most of these critiques are attempts to demonstrate
how Derrida misreads Hegel or Lacan in such a way as to miss the parallels between
their thought and his own.12 Žižek's recent work, Less Than Nothing, contains several
passages in which Žižek explicitly appropriates Derridean language to articulate his
own ideas, speaking about his ontology and politics in terms of l’avenir,13 différance14
and pharmakon.15
And yet, for all this proximity, there remains a crucial difference between the two
thinkers. This difference takes the form of what Žižek calls the parallax gap, where
what changes is not the basic configuration of thought but the perspective from which
that basic configuration is seen, a subtle shift in register which is sometimes so small as
to seem almost imperceptible but which, nonetheless, changes everything. 16 For
example, Žižek says that Derrida unearths the impossibility of identity and yet cannot
make the Hegelian move of recognising that impossibility is, precisely, constitutive of
identity; Derrida speaks about a central signifier which imposes stability on meaning
and also about an excessive element within the system which functions simultaneously
as lack and as surplus; but he cannot recognise that the supplement and the master
signifier are one and the same.17
Žižek fully endorses Derrida's notion that any identity is always already ruptured,
impossible, but for Žižek, he and Derrida are distinguished according to the different
ways in which they relate to this impossibility. He describes this difference in terms
of the Lacanian distinction between desire and drive, which are the two ways of
relating to the lost object, the impossibility at the heart of identity. For Žižek, Derrida
relates to impossibility according to the logic of desire, which both knows that
identity is impossible and yet will not give up hope in the possibility of wholeness;
whereas Žižek seeks to relate to impossibility according to the Lacanian logic of
drive which, realising that no object can ever satisfy it, instead begins to derive
its satisfaction precisely from repeatedly missing the object of desire.18 So desire
aims for wholeness and repeatedly fails; drive does the same thing but failure is
precisely its aim.
11 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 11.
12 For example: ‘the problem with the Derridean approach is that it systematically overlooks the Hegelian
character of its own basic operation’ (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor
(London: Verso, 2008), 32); ‘Derrida’s criticism of Lacan is a case of prodigious misreading [but if we] tackle
the problematic nature of their relationship en détail … a series of unexpected connections open up’ (The
Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Causality (London: Verso, 2005).
13 Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London and New York: Verso,
2012), 264.
14 Less than Nothing, 377.
15 Less than Nothing, 342.
16 The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 167.
17 The Metastases of Enjoyment, 195–196.
18 So, for example, in Less than Nothing Žižek criticises Derrida because he ‘has privileged the side of desire/
lack, conceiving the process of différance as always failed and lacking with regard to the goal of Messianic
Justice’ (377), whereas his own work privileges the drive which ‘turns failure into triumph – in it, thevery
failure to reach its goal … generates a satisfaction of its own’ (498).
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This difference between Derrida and Žižek is also a specifically gendered difference.
The configuration of desire, language and being which is present in negative theology
from its inception has always been gendered.19 Yet, while Derrida’s work seeks to
unsettle both the ground of being and the gendering of philosophy, he also insists on an
‘irreducible gap’ between ‘ontological difference and gender difference’.20 By contrast,
Žižek’s reliance on the Lacanian account of subjectivity, sexuality and mysticism
means that the question of gender becomes central to the question of human identity
and transformation.
Lacan, Sexuation, and Feminist Philosophy
While Derrida’s discussions of mysticism tend to focus on the negative theology of
Dionysius the Areopagite, whose ‘mysticism of the intellect’ is primarily philosophical
and abstract rather than affective, 21 Lacan appeals instead to much later forms of
mysticism in which individual experience is foregrounded. Yet, the central themes of
Dionysius’ work remain present, particularly in Lacan’s Seminar XX, which deal not
only with gender, sexuality and mysticism, but also with ontology, God and Neopla-
tonism.22
For Lacan, the subject is brought into being by the creation of a boundary, a cut
which is both an internal fissure and a division between the self and others. This cut is
to do with the way that the subject is, from the very beginning, caught up in the
economy of the desire and the language of others, and also to do with the gap between
the human child's ability to conceive of herself as a particular individual and her ability
to control the boundaries of her own identity. The cut is also the cut of what Lacan calls
‘castration’ and at the core of Lacan's account of sexuation is his thesis that the
masculine and feminine subjective positions are two ways of relating to this essential
incompleteness of the subject.
Central to Lacan's account is his notorious claim that ‘there’s no such thing as a
sexual relationship’. This is the dual claim that, on the one hand, the sexual relationship
does not do what it ostensibly sets out to do and, on the other hand, that this failure is
precisely its real aim.23 The sexual relationship is, in Lacanian terminology, essentially
about the relationship to the phallus, which represents for the subject that which was
lost as they came into being. It stands for sexuality insofar as it relies on the fantasy of
wholeness, of the subject's completion, the Aristophanic fantasy that there is some
19 As Grace Jantzen discusses at length in Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
20 Catherine Malabou, Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy trans. Carolyn
Shread (Cambridge and Maldon: Polity, 2011), 21.
21 Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism, 108. Whilst it is possible to argue, as Andrew Louth does
in his Denys the Areopagite (London: Chapman, 1989), that Dionysius’ work ought to be situated in his
liturgical and ecclesial context, his negative theology relies primarily on theological and philosophical
arguments rather than the appeal to individual experience which came, over time, to be seen as characteristic
of mystical theology (a process which, again, Jantzen’s Power, Gender, and Christian mysticism traces).
22 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge.
Encore 1972–1973, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Bruce Fink (New York and London: W. W.
Norton, 1998).
23 Seminar XX, 34.
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person out there who will complete me. For Lacan, the sexual relationship is doomed to
fail because it is never really about two people becoming one but about the clash of two
individuals' narcissistic attempts to reduce the other person to that which is required to
make each of them a harmonious whole. This impossibility of the sexual relationship,
of being completed by another person is, for Lacan, precisely the point: since it is only
my incompleteness which brings me into being in the first place, completion represents
not happiness or dissatisfaction but the dissolution of the subject, psychosis or death.24
For Lacan, there are two ways of relating to this inevitable failure of the sexual
relationship, the ‘male’ way or the ‘female’ way (although Lacan does sometimes
attempt to distinguish between men and masculinity and women and femininity, he
does not do so consistently).25 The male way is the logic of desire, which relies on the
fantasy of the possibility of attaining wholeness by re-integrating the lost object, yet
which must constantly and unconsciously sabotage itself in order to prevent the
dissolution of the subject; this is the logic, says Lacan, of courtly love, of the deliberate
choice of an unattainable beloved. But to explicate this logic of femininity, Lacan turns
to mysticism, citing in particular the writings of Hadewijch, of St John of the Cross, and
Bernini's statue of Theresa of Avila. There are some obvious problems here, as Lacan
seeks to explicate feminine subjectivity via a woman, one man and a man's depiction of
a woman in ecstasy (he goes on, modestly, to include his own Écrits in the canon of
mystical writing).26
The contrast between masculinity and femininity, says Lacan, is the contrast between
eros and love. Where masculine eros seeks to make two into one, to gather the
multiplicity of the world into a single unity, a Neoplatonic One, feminine love relates
to the other as a singular individual.27 Instead of eros, the gathering of everything into
union, Lacan says that analysis seeks to assert the existence of the One as a singular
individual, and to explore not desire but love. In some ways, this is an attempt to reinstate
Anders Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape, but unlike Nygren, Lacan ranges
mysticism on the side of agape rather than eros, despite its associations with Neoplato-
nism and erotic union with God.28]
This account of ‘feminine’, mystical jouissance is deeply ambiguous. On the one
hand, because for Lacan there is no subject prior to castration, he rejects any attempt to
reify the figure of the woman as the maternal ground of being, the promise of
24 In contrast to the Neoplatonism which sees everything which exists as emerging from the simplicity of the
One, ultimately to return to it, Lacan rejects the notion of ‘a closed one’ as ‘a mirage’, a ‘false unity’ (The
Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain
Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1998), 26. This represents a double
transformation of the basic model which underlies much Christian theology in general and mystical theology
in particular. First, rather than seeing God as the One from whose desire the world emerges, it is the subject,
the desire of the individual which is given priority. Second, the longing for union which is characteristic of so
much mystical theology is taken not as the deepest longing of the human heart but as a false hope, a fantasy,
which prevents the subject from confronting the fact that insofar as she is one at all this one is ‘the one of the
split, of the stroke, of rupture’ (Seminar XI, 26).
25 Seminar XX, 57.
26 Seminar XX, 76.
27 This process of gathering the many into one is, Lacan argues, a fantasy, it is simply not possible, and it was
precisely to explain this impossibility that Freud introduced the notion of the death drive (Seminar XX, 66–67).
28 Lacan does in fact mention Nygren in passing, describing him as ‘no stupider than anyone else’ (Seminar
XX, 75).
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wholeness or a lost edenic state, just as Derrida rejects the notion of the God of
ontotheology as the ground of language.29 But it is precisely Lacan's troubling gender
politics which problematise this attempt to assign women to the side of love. While he
valorises women's mystical experience he associates this mystical experience with a
‘jouissance of the body’which women can experience but cannot speak about, which is
somehow present in women's mystical texts and yet can only be articulated by a
man, by Jacques Lacan. 30 This ambiguity over the relationship of women to
language, the body and mystical experience leaves a complicated legacy with which
Lacan's successors wrestle.
Particularly important in the reception of these elements of Lacan’s work are Luce
Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, who pick up Lacan’s problema of sexual difference and
grapple with it in different ways. Whilst the two have significant differences with one
another as well as with Lacan, they have one crucial commonality. Where, for Lacan,
the cut that brings the subject into being is both internal to the subject and also a cut
between the subject and the other, both Irigaray and Kristeva focus on the distinction
between the subject and the other rather than on the distinction internal to the subject.
Irigaray’s work prioritises distinction, focusing her attention on the question of how to
establish men and women as sufficiently separate beings that they are able to relate to
one another as other.31 She values mysticism because it gives women a distinctive
voice: the mystical writings are, she says, ‘the only place in the history of the West in
which woman speaks and acts so publicly.’32 By contrast, Kristeva’s work seeks to
trouble distinction, exploring, through her key notions of the semiotic and the abject,
the blurring of the boundaries between the self and the other. The semiotic in particular
is associated with mysticism, which Kristeva values insofar as it unsettles settled
identities.33
29 ‘Mother’ is the role that women play in the sexual relationship within which they are positioned as objet
petit a (35); the figure of the woman is the fantasy of a ‘prediscursive reality’ which does not exist (32).
30 Although Lacan acknowledges that there is such a thing as a ‘lady analysts’ he does not, apparently
consider it worth his while to name any of them, let alone cite them (Seminar XX, 57).
31 In a 1995 interview, Irigaray suggests that her work can be understood to consist of three stages: first, a
critique of the masculine subject as all-encompassing, refusing to make space for the feminine other; second,
an attempt to articulate subjectivity from the perspective of this feminine other; and third, an attempt to
understand subjectivity in terms of intersubjectivity and a dialectic of self and other, subjectivity and
objectivity (Elizabeth Hirsh, Gary A. Olson, and Gaëton Brulotte, “‘Je-Luce Irigaray’: A Meeting with Luce
Irigaray,” Hypatia 10, no. 2 (1995), 96–97). As Elizabeth Grosz argues, fundamental to all of these stages is
the assertion that ‘sexual difference is the engine or force involved in the production of all other differences
and thus has an ontological status that is radically different from… other differences’ (Elizabeth Grosz, ‘The
Nature of Sexual Difference: Irigaray and Darwin’ in Angelaki 17.2 (2012), 73).
32 Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 191.
33 So, for example, for Kristeva, ‘feminine faith’ can be said to identify ‘more with the crucible of mysticism
than with a dogma, whatever it may be’; when Eckhart asks God to rid him of God, he is envisioning ‘that
nonplace, that unthinkable outside’ which belongs to the ‘feminine or the maternal’, where the feminine is not
the opposite of the masculine but something which precedes it, which comes ‘“before the beginning”’, before
the creation which ‘comes out of a cut’, out of separation (in Catherine Clément and Julia Kristeva, The
Feminine and the Sacred trans. Jane Marie Todd (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 60, 73, 152). Similarly,
elsewhere, Kristeva argues that ‘mysticism… is vouchsafed only to those who take the “maternal” upon
themselves’, the maternal being ‘the ambivalent principle that derives on the one hand from the species and on
the other hand from a catastrophe of identity…that somehow involves our imaginary representations of
femininity, non-language, or the body’ (‘Stabat Mater’ ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer,
in Poetics Today 6.1 (1985), 134).
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Žižek: the Mystical as Material
By contrast, Žižek’s response to the Lacanian account of sexuation is to propose an
ontology of the subject in which the crucial distinction is not between subjects but is
internal to the subject. In doing so, he draws together Lacanian psychoanalysis with
Hegelian dialectics and contemporary science. This idiosyncratic synthesis enables
him, effectively, to repeat the original move of mystical theology, the connection that
thinkers like Dionysius the Areopagite make between the subject’s desire, the structure
of language and subsequently the structure of being itself.
While, for Lacan, the cut which brings the subject into being is both an internal
fissure and a division between the subject and the Other; Žižek's Hegelian reading of
Lacan is absolutely clear that the rupture internal to the subject has priority over the
rupture between the subject and others. ‘Man’ and ‘woman’ together do not form a
Whole, he argues ‘since each of them is already in itself a failed Whole.’34 Žižek argues
that for Lacan, it is the grafting of the subject's inherent incompleteness onto the act of
sex, the attempt to find an impossible completeness via sexuality, which results in the
necessary failure, the impossibility of the sexual relationship. ‘What we experience as
sexuality’, Žižek says, ‘is precisely the effect of the contingent act of “grafting” the
fundamental deadlock of symbolization on to the biological opposition of male and
female’.35 The biological act of intercourse is treated as a means to resolve a symbolic
deadlock, and so, it inevitably fails.
This means that, for Žižek, the difference between men and women is not a
difference of essence or even of relation to one another per se, but a difference between
ways of relating to the universal structure of human subjectivity. Men and women are
related as desire is related to drive and so are separated only by a parallax shift, this shift
between two perspectives on the same basic structure. For this reason, Žižek strenu-
ously resists any appeal to a ‘feminine essence’ or any suggestion that it is possible to
understand women outside of the phallic symbolic order. 36 For him, the feminine
subjective position fully acknowledges the gap which exists at the heart of all subjec-
tivity, whereas the masculine subjective position seeks to deny and externalise this gap.
Because, for Žižek, the subject is brought into being by the symbolic order (which
cannot be disentangled from the body or materiality more generally), it is not possible
to appeal, as Kristeva does, to a pre-linguistic semiotic, or to suggest, as Irigaray does,
that it is possible to create a feminine form of subjectivity which escapes the positioning
of women by masculine discourse.37 Women belong to the symbolic order; they are, if
anything, more fully incorporated into it than men. To suggest that there is some
element of feminine subjectivity which escapes the symbolic order is, precisely, to
34 Metastases of Enjoyment, 159–160.
35 Metastases of Enjoyment, 155.
36 Žižek argues that even in their attempts to reject male clichés about the feminine ‘in itself’, Kristeva and
Irigaray account for femininity, nonetheless, in terms of male clichés, precisely because ‘the male represen-
tation of woman is the same as woman in herself; the difference concerns only the place, the purely formal
modality of the comprehension of the same content’ (The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related
Matters (London: Verso, 1996), 160.
37 For Žižek it is both the case that the body is formed by language, that it is ‘enmeshed in the signifier’s
network’ and ‘survives as dismembered, mortified’ by language (The Sublime Object of Ideology (London:
Verso, 1989), 136), and also that language is that which ‘sticks out from the (human) body, disfiguring its
unity’ (Parallax View, 84).
M. Rose
repeat a masculine fantasy. 38 To posit a ‘feminine essence’ is to locate feminine
resistance to the symbolic order, to continue to posit women as the inert, resistant
material upon which the symbolic order builds; to see femininity as intrinsic to the
symbolic order is, for Žižek, to open up the possibility of transforming the symbolic
order by exposing its inherent excess, its internal contradictions.39
For Žižek, then, Kristeva and Irigaray are almost right to appeal to the outside of
language or the other of subjectivity, except that this otherness, this semiotic, this body,
is not really outside of the subject but is internal to the subject. That which transcends
the subject is the subject itself; transcendence is not the external intervention of another
being but the crack within immanence, which constitutes immanence.40 For Žižek, the
mystical experience proper is not the confrontation with a transcendent other but the
confrontation with the subject's own inherent limitation.
But Žižek’s reworking of mysticism and gender does not stop here. Žižek’s earlier
work brings together this structure of ‘the one of the split’ with both Hegelian dialectics
and Marxist ideology critique in order to suggest that society too is internally ruptured,
generating its own excess. Just as gender is the attempt of individual subjects to
externalise their constitutive antagonism, so too with class struggle: the one of society
is ‘“held together” by the very antagonism, split, that forever prevents its closure in a
harmonious, transparent, rational Whole.’ 41 After a crucial engagement with both
Schelling and quantum physics, Žižek further extends this basic model of identity to
material reality itself.42 The material world is constituted by ‘a pre-transcendental gap/
rupture, the Freudian name for which is the drive’.43 This is, effectively, a repetition of
the move which constituted the birth of mystical theology, when thinkers including
Dionysius and Augustine drew on Plato and Plotinus to articulate an account of
theological speech which was essentially bound up both with the individual’s desire
and with the structure of the created world as a whole. Neoplatonism positions the goal
of human life as the return to the One from which it came, an absorption into an
originary state of harmony which cannot, ultimately, be separated from death, the
undoing of the process by which individual beings and bodies came into existence.
By contrast, Žižek’s account of material, individual and social identity as all alike
structured as internally inconsistent, ruptured wholes positions this very inconsistency,
the impossibility of completion, as generative.
38 Again, specifically in contrast to Irigaray and Kristeva’s attempts to traverse the ‘frontier’ which separates
feminine enjoyment from ‘(the male) discourse’, femininity is not that which lies beyond the limit but ‘this
structure of the limit as such’, so that ‘all we perceive in this Beyond (the Eternal Feminine, for example) are
our own fantasy projections’ (Metastases of Enjoyment, 151).
39 The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 2000), 254; see also In
Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 66 where Žižek compares his account of gendered subjectivity
to Christian monotheism is in contrast to the dualistic ‘New Age’ notion of the necessity of balancing cosmic
masculine and feminine principles.
40 Insofar as there is any justification in Žižek's work for this association of masculinity with desire and
femininity with drive it functions according to the logic of the preferential option for the poor in liberation
theology: that the fact of patriarchy means that women are so often forced to perform a particular function in
the narcissistic economy of men that it is harder for them to entertain narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence.
41 For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London: Verso, 2008), 100.
42 This shift took place around 1994 and is discussed both by Adam Kotsko in Žižek and Theology (London:
T&T Clark, 2008), 6–7 and by Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher in Žižek and Politics: A Critical
Introduction (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 111.
43 Less than Nothing, 6–7.
The Mystical and the Material: Slavoj Žižek and the French Reception of Mysticism
This broadening of the structure of the Lacanian subject to encompass the whole of
material reality allows Žižek to take the basic gesture of transposing the opposition
between the subject and the other into a rupture within the subject and to repeat it at a
number of different levels: so, for example, the gendered opposition between the body
and language becomes a rupture within language, as does the opposition between
mystical experience or apophasis and language; the opposition between immanence
and transcendence becomes a rupture within immanence, and the opposition between
nature and grace becomes a rupture within nature.
What Žižek offers to feminist philosophy of religion is the possibility of thinking
Christian mystical discourse according to the logic of drive rather than desire; a model
of theological speech which sees mystical language delighting in perpetually circling
around the point of its failure, as the attempt to speak of God which succeeds precisely
by failing, over and over again. The logic of drive would be one which delights in
materiality as one manifestation of creation ex nihilo, which sees the act of creation, of
division, as a good in itself, not merely something to be undone in order to return to
union with God. Materiality is not something to be surpassed, but the very condition of
our existence; the imperfection, incompleteness and multiplicity of the material world is
not a problem to be solved but the generative possibility of life, difference and newness.
Žižek offers to feminist philosophy of religion resources for imagining an alternative to
the ‘deathly symbolic’ of Western philosophical thought and a model for what Marcella
Althaus Reid calls a ‘materialist theology’44 and Grace Jantzen ‘a poetics of natality’.45
Just as for Žižek, femininity is the inherent excess which represents the possibility for
the transformation of the masculine symbolic order, so too from Žižek’s work can be
brought forth new possibilities for feminist philosophy of religion.
44 Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (London: Routledge, 2000), 6.
45 Foundations of Violence, 35.
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